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CASE COMMENTS
ADVERSE POSSESSION-WHERE ONE CTAIMNG UNDER COLOR OF T=y

is

SAcTuAL POSSESSION OF LAND, LAW BY CONSTRUCTION CARRIES POSSESSION TO THE FULL EXTENT OF BOUNDARY AS AGAINST

ACTUAL .ADVERSR

POSSESSION op SUPERiRo TITzE WHERE ENTRY AND POSSESSION A NOT O
INTERFERENE--In an action by appellant to quiet title to a tract of 150
acres of land, it was proved that he had held under an invalid recorded
deed for a period of more than 15 years and that while he had only
occupied a part his claim of the whole was sufficiently evidenced by the
deed. The exact amount or proportionate amount actually occupied is
not disclosed. Appellees were occupying some sixty-two acres but were
not doing so under either an adverse claim or superior title. Held,
That law by construction carries possession to -full extent of boundary.
Stepp v. Stepp, et al., 216 Ky. 243, 287 S. W. 707.
The general rule in Kentucky is beyond all doubt in accord with the
principal case. The following cases are illustrative: Ramsey v. Hughes,
212 Ky. 715, 280 S. W. 99; Elliot v. Hensley, 188 Ky. 444, 222 S. W. 507;
Slaven v. Dority, 142 Ky. 640, 134 S. W. 116. A much more comprehensive list of Kentucky cases is given in the first cited case. That the
general rule in America is likewise in accord with the case at hand
is so well known as to require no citation of authority; indeed the "doctrine of constructive adverse possession is distinctly an American doctrine."
Yet all of the elements which are present in the principal case must
be present for the Kentucky Court of Appeals to give effect to the doctrine. The absence of any one will defeat the case. Of course the claim
must be under color -of title. Meade v. Ratliff, 133 Ky. 411, 118 S. W.
271. The part of the land occupied must belong to the same person
as the part not occupied. Tennis Coql Co. v. Saclcett, 172 Ky. 729, 190
S. W. 130. The land in actual possession must adjoin that of which
constructive possession is claimed. Parsons v. Dils, 172 Ky. 774, 189
S. W. 1158. The conveyance which furnishes color Of title must contain a sufficient description of the land sought to be conveyed. Ramsey
v. Hughes, supra.
The only matter not absolutely clear in the principal case c:ncerns the question as to whether the land not occupied was a reasonable appendage to the land actually occupied. The rule in many states
makes such a requirement. Thompson v. Burhans, 61 N. Y. 52. In
other states, however, the only requirement is that the part actually
occupied be of a visible character, no matter how small in compar_ on
with the whole. Taliaferrov. Butler, 77 Tex. 578, 14 S. W. 191. The Kentucky cases do not clearly evidence which position its court takes. In
the principal case it is not even explicitely proved that the appellant
either lived in a house within the boundary or enclosed or cultivated
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any certain portion of the land. In any event the appellant did not
occupy sixty-two acres of the one hundred fifty which he claimed.
G.R.
AuTOMOBILE-CITY HELD AUTHORIZED TO ADOPT ZONING ORDINANCE
REGULATING LOCATION OF FILING STATIONS-Appellant owned a corner
lot in the city of Hopkinsville. This lot was less than a hundred feet
distant from the Methodist church of that city. After he had been
refused a permit for the erection of a filling station on the lot, appellant filed this action for a mandamus against the city authorities to
compel them to issue the permit. After the suit had been filed the city
passed an ordinance zoning the city. The ordinance provided that
filling stations might be established anywhere in the business section
of the town, as defined by the ordinance, but that they should not be
established in the residential section of the city, as therein defined,
within one hundred feet of any church or school. Held, city was authorized to adopt zoning ordinance regulating location of filling stations
by Ky. Statutes, section 3290, subsections 15 and 16. Cayce v. City of
Hopkinsville, et al., 217 Ky. 135, 289 S. W. 223.
The statutory provisions which are the basis of the decision give
the city the power "to regulate" the storage of certain specified combustibles "and other combustible, explosive or inflammable material;*'
and "to make all police regulations to secure and protect the general
health, comfort, convenience, morals and safety of the public."
The Kentucky Court of Appeals was admittedly influenced by the
recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in Village of Euclid,
Ohio, v. Ambler Realty Co., 47 S. Ct. 114. In that case the court took
cognizance of the complex conditions of present-day life and allowed
"a degree of elasticity, not to the meaning but to the application of
constitutional principles, statutes and ordinances." While applying the
historic rule that the business prohibited must almost amount to a
nuisance, the court said that whether a business is a nuisance or not
is to be determined largely by the circumstince and the locality. "A
nuisance may be merely the right thing in the wrong place, like a
pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard." This decision reflects
the effect of a number of recent decisions by state courts which have
adopted a very broad view of this matter. City of Aurora v. Burns, 319
Ill. 48, 149 N. E. 784; Ware v. City of Wichita, 113 Kan. 153, 214 P. 99.
The principal case is likewise illustrative of many cases which are
destined to reflect the effect of the decision by the Supreme Court.
The following questions very properly arise after a study of the
principal case: Would the Court of Appeals now be willing to uphold a
zoning ordinance which absolutely prohibited the erection of filling
stations in residential sections of a city under the present statutes?
Is not an express zoning enabling act necessary? To be sure the
language chosen by the court is indicative of a liberal handling of any
such ordinance. Yet the fact that the ordinance in question only pro-
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hibited that which would have otherwise amounted to a nuisance per
se does not lend much encouragement to those who say such an ordinance would be constitutional. At any rate the states which have
adopted so broad a view also have broad enabling acts. Laws of
Illinois, page 180 (1921) is illustrative. Kentucky has no such act.
Such a case as the one here conjectured came before the North Carolina
court in Bizzefl v. Board of Aldermen of City of Goldsboro, 135 S. E.
50 '(Oct. 20, 1926). In that state the statutory provisions are almost
identical with those in Kentucky. The court held that an ordinance
prohibiting filling stations being erected in the residence districts
without the consent of the board of aldermen was not authorized by the
statutes. Probably a like result would be reached in Kentucky were
G. R.
the matter tested at the present time.
AuTomoB Es-FOR HEAD OF FAMMIY TO BE RESPONSBLE FOR NEGLiGEXCE OF MEMBER OF FAMILY IN OPERATION OF AUTOMOBILE UNDER FAmnLY

PuRPosE DOCTRINE, OPERATOR AT TnE TT

OF THE AcOIDnNT MUST BE

OPERATING IT WITHIN THE ScOPE OF THE FA my

PuaPosE---Plaintiff was

run over and injured by an automobile belonging to defendant and
driven by defendant's son. The plaintiff grounded her action on the
family purpose doctrine. The son at the time of the accident was
twenty three years of age and married but separated from his wife.
He was living with his parents and paying board. Defendant bought
the automobile for the use of the family. The son was the only one who
could drive the car and on Sunday often took his parents out for a ride.
He used the car to go to and from work and at the time of the accident
was using it solely for the purpose of returning from work. Held:
That the son was not at the time of the accident operating the automobile in such relationship to defendant as to fasten liability upon her
for the accident under the family purpose doctrine. Rauckhorst v.
Kraut, 216 Ky. 233, 287 S. W. 895.
The family purpose doctrine was first announced by the Kentucky
Court in the case of Stowe v. Morris, 147 Ky. 386, 144 S. W. 52, 39 L.
R. A. (N. S.) 224. The rule as adopted by this court as well as that of
several other states is that one who provides an automobile for the
pleasure and convenience of himself and family, is liable for injuries
caused by the negligent operation of the machine while it is being used
for the pleasure or convenience of a member of his family. Daily v.
MaxwelZ, 152 Mo. App. 415, 133 S. W. 351; King v. Smythe, 140 Tenn.
217, 204 S. W. 296; Bir. v. Abercrombie, 74 Wash. 486, 133 Pac. 1020;
Kayser v. Van Nest, 125 Minn. 277, 146 N. W. 1091. Since the adoption of the family purpose doctrine in Kentucky the cases of Doss v.
Monticello Light Co., 193 Ky. 499, 236 S. W. 1046; Miller v. Wecl, 186
Ky. 552, 217 S. W. 904;. Holland v. Goode, 188 Ky. 525, 222 S. W. 950
have been decided, all recognizing the doctrine as part of the law of
this jurisdiction.
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The sole question before the court in the principal case was to
determine whether .the evidence brought the case within such doctrine.
A view accepted in a number of jurisdictions is that where a car is
kept for family purposes and used by a child of the owner for his own
pleasure, it comes under the family purpose rule and the owner will be
liable. Crittenden v. Murphy, 36 Cal. App. 803, 173 Pac. 595; Griffen v.
Russel, 144 Ga. 275, 87 S. E. 10; King v. Smythe, supra. There is much
authority to the contrary. Watkins v. Clark, 103 Kan. 629, 176 Pac.
131; Van Blaricom v. Dodgson, 220 N. Y. 111, 115 N. E. 443; Arkin v.
Page, 287 Ill. 420, 123 N. E. 30. The latter case holds that the owner
Is not liable when the machine is being driven by a member of the family who is using it for a purpose of his own. In accord is the case of
Heissenbuttel v. Meagher, 162 App. Div. 752, 147 N. Y. S. 1087.
In Hayes v. Hogan, 273 Mo. 1, 200 S. W. 286, it was held that mere
ownership of an automobile purchased by a father for the use and
pleasure of his family would not render him liable to a third person
for injuries sustained thereby through the negligence of his minor son
while operating it on the highway in furtherance of his own business
or pleasure. In this case there was a tendency on the part of the Missouri court to relax the rule established by the earlier cases. If the
car is being used against the authority of the parent it is not within
the family rule. LinviZZe v. Nissen, 162 N. C. 95, 75 S. E. 1096.
The principal case is a clearer one than any cited above. Here
the adult son was using the automobile solely for the purpose of getting
bimself to and from his own work, paying his own board and advancing
no purpose but his own at the time of the accident. No purpose whatever of the family was served. Such use was clearly not within the
scope of the family purpose. The Pennsylvania Court reached a similar
decision in Markle v. Perot, 273 Pa. St. 4, 116 Atl. 542, when it held
that a father was not liable for the negligent driving of an adult son,
while using the car for purposes of his own, even though the father
consented to such use and the son resided with him. As we have seen
the opinions of the courts are hopelessly divided on the correctness of
the family purpose doctrine. There is however a tendency to relax the
rule as shown by Hayes v. Hogan, supra, and the very modern trend is
against the family purpose doctrine. The Kentucky court as shown
by the instant case, while recognizing the doctrine as part of our law,
seems to recognize the unsoundness of it and is making an effort to
R. R. R.
limit its scope.
AUTOmoBILS-STATE MAY PROHIBIT THE USE OF THE PuBLIc HIGHWAYS FOP PRIVATE BUSINESS on GRANT THE RIGHT TO ONE AND REFUSE IT

ANOTHER--The appellants, owners and operators of taxicabs, brought
action under the Declaratory Judgment Act to test the validity of section 21a, chapter 112 of the Acts of 1926. The appellees had been
granted a permit by the commissioner of motor transportation to
operate motor buses over a highway between certain fixed termini in
To
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Harlan county. The appellants had not applied for a permit but contended that the section in question was contrary to section 3 of the
state constitution.
Section 12a, chapter 112 of the Acts of 1926 reads as follows:
"'Casual trips' as used in this act and section means that any person,
firm, or corporation not operating under a certificate between a fixed
termini or over a regular route may operate over any route between a
fixed termini where other person or persons hold a certificate or certificates, provided that on said casual trips no one shall be allowed to
pick up any passenger along the route, nor be permitted on the return
trip to haul any person or persons other than those included in the
original trip."
Section 3, of the constitution, reads In part: "All men when they
form a social compact are equal; and no grant of excessive, separate
public emoluments or privileges shall be made to any man, or any set
of men except in the consideration of public service."
The court held that the appellees were performing public service
within the meaning of the constitution, and that the section of chapter
112 complained of was constitutional, as the state under its police power
has a right to prohibit the use of the highways as places of private business, such as appellants sought to carry on, or grant the right to one
and refuse it to another. Harrisonet al. v. Big FourBus Lines, 217 Ky.
119, 288 S. W. 1049.
Chapter 112 of the Acts of 1926 reenacted all the essential features
of chapter 81 of the Acts of 1924. Section 21a was not a part of the
latter, but the court in the principle case to some extent followed the
reasoning of the case of Reo Bus Lines Co. v. The Southern Bus Line
Co., 209 Ky. 40, 272 S. W. 18, which case upheld the validity of chapter
81 of the acts of 1924. The court in that case said, "But it was never
contemplated that the highways should form a part of the capital stock
of common carriers engaged in the transportation of persons or property for profit, or that the use 'f the highways should be donated to
them for that purpose.
"Clearly these companies have no vested or inherent right in the
highways, and their unrestrained use thereof is equivalent to an appropriation of public property for private use, and it is within the power
of the legislature to prohibit this use or to prescribe the terms upon
which it may be regulated."
In the case of In Re James, 99 Vermont 265, 132 Atl. 40 (1926),
which case was cited in the principle case, the court said, "While a citizen has the right to travel upon the highways, and transport his property thereon, in the ordinary course of life and business, he can acquire
no vested or inherent right to use them for commercial purposes. The
right, common to all, to the use of the highways, is the ordinary use
made thereof and by no means includes the special and extraordinary
use of a common carrier for commercial purposes or private gain. The
latter the legislature in the exercise of its police powers, may wholly

CASE COMENTS
deny, or may permit it to some and deny it to others, as will best promote the general good of the public."
Everywhere such statutes have come up for consideration, in the
last few months th6 holding has been in conformity with the principle
case. The trend seems to be in one direction. See Kinder v. Loony,
283 S. W. 9 (Arkansas); Holmes v. Railroad Commission of California,
242 P. 486; Red Star Motor Driver'sAss'n v. City of Detroit, 234 MIch.
398, 208 N. W. 602; Omaha and Council Bluffs Street Railway v. City of
Omaha, 208 N. W. 123 (Neb.); Coney Island Motor Bus Corporationv.
Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, 152 N. E. 25; Gilmer v. Public Utilities Commission of Utah, 247 P. 284; City of Pine Bluff v. Arkansas
Traveler Bus Co., 285 S. W. 375; Dreyer v. City Council of Union City,
134 A. 624 (N. J.); Maine Motor Coaches v. Public Utilities Commission,
130 A. 866; State v. Johnson, 75 Mont. 240, 243 P. 1073; Smallwood v.
Jeter, (Idaho) 244 P. 149; Greeley TransportationCo v. People, (Colo.)
245 P. 720; and "The Law of Automobiles," by Berry, Section 1702.
J. S. F.
CARRMS-REG

ATION THAT JEWELRY "SHOULD NOT BE ENcLosED

N

PERSONAL BAGGAGE OA CnEoxEo" HnLD NOT TO ExcLuDE JEwEaRY AS BAGGAoE.-Complainant packed some valuable jewelry in her trunk and
checked it at the railroad station in Louisville. The trunk was sent
on the same train on which she was a passenger. An employee of defendant broke open the trunk and stole a part of the jewelry which was
valued at $715.00. Counsel for defendant contended that the regulation
filed by the railroad company with the Interstate Commerce Comnission, that jewelry "should not be enclosed in personal baggage or
checked," excluded jewelry as baggage. Held, the language of the regulation Is not susceptible to the interpretation of excluding jewelry as
baggage so as to preclude recovery from carrier, but is only advisory or
remonstrative that jewelry should not be shipped as baggage or checked,
and it should be so construed. Illinois CentralRailroad Co. v. Fontaine,
217 Ky. 211, 289 S. W. 263.
"Baggage is defined to be the necessary appendages of a traveler;
personal apparel and such effects as a passenger requires for his personal use and convenience in the prosecution of a journey. As an incident to the passenger's contract for transportation the carrier transports a certain reasonable amount of baggage." This principle is set
forth in Laodesman-Hirscheimer Co. v. Louisville & X. R. Co., 178 Ky.
712, 199 S. W. 1050, and appears to be with the weight of authority.
Kansas City S. Ry. Co. v. Skinner, 88 Ark. 189, 113 S. W. 1019; Chicago
R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Whitten, 90 Ark. 462, 119 S. W. 835; Denver & R. G.
R. Co. v. .Iohnson, 50 Colo. 187, 114 P. 650. The present case hold that
jewelry comes within that class of articles defined as baggage, and
therefore cannot be excluded. This holding accords with the majority
view, which is expressed in Pullman Co. v. Green, 128 Ga. 142, 57 S. E.
223, as follows: The effects which a passenger may properly carry with
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him on a journey may properly include articles for personal adornment,
such as jewels. Doerner v. St. Louis & S. F. R1. Go., 149 Mo. App. 170,
130 S. W. 62; Hasbrouch v. X. Y. Cent. & H. R. R. Co., 64 Misc. Rep.
478, 118 N. Y. S. 735; Godfrey v. Pullman Co., 87 S. C. 361, 69 S. E. 666;
Sherman v. Pullman Co., 79 Misc. Rep. 50, 139 N. Y. S. 51. In the latter
case a diamond necklace, carried by a female passenger, though not
used on the journey, was held to be baggage.
It will be noticed that in the present case the court construed the
language in the regulation to be only advisory and not effective to
exclude the jewelry as baggage, "for when the carrier attempts under
the provisions of the law to limit its common-law liability it should do
so by no doubtful language." More assertive grounds for reaching this
conclusion, that jewelry is baggage, and is not excluded, were stressed
in the case of Bush v. Beauchamp, 132 Ark. 582, 201 S. W. 828. There
it was said that jewelry is "baggage" and an interstate carrier cannot
make it otherwise by rules and regulations filed with the Commerce
Commission, although it can properly limit the amount of its liabilities.
The court were of the opinion "that the carrier cannot by its rules and
regulations limit the meaning of baggage so as to exclude articles which
are usually included in the generally accepted meaning of its terms."
In the light of these decisions the conclusion of the Kentucky court
clearly came within the majority view of the question, and is firmly
E. C. M.
founded in the common law.
CORPORATIONS-OJECTIQN THAT ELEVATOR COMPANY'S CONTRACT LiEN"
FOR STORAGE OF TAN

CARS wAs ULTRA ViREs CANNOT BE RAIsED BY UIN-

SECURED SUBSEQUENT CREsmToa. The Kentucky Tank Line placed some
of its cars in storage with the defendant. Later the plaintiff brought
suit against the tank line to recover on a claim for transportation.
Judgment was recovered and an execution that issued on the judgment
was levied on the tank cars then in possesion of the defendant. Later
the defendant sued the tank line to recover for storage and to enforce
its lien on the tank cars then in its possession. The railroad company
was made party defendant and set up its lien under the execution.
Issue was joined and on the final hearing the elevator company was
adjudged a prior lien on the property. The railroad company appealed
from this decision. Appellant's main contention was that as appellee
was authorized by its charter to store grain only, the contract for the
storage of tank cars was ultra vires and appellant had right to raise
the issue. This was met by the appellee's insistence that only the state,
stock holders of the corporation or creditors may challenge the validity
of an ultra vires act. Held that the appellants cannot raise the question
as to the validity of an ultra vires act as it was an unsecured subsequent creditor. PennsylvaniaRailroaa Co. v. Kentucky Public Elevator
,Co., 217 Ky. 48; 288 S. W. 1024.
The right to complain of an ultra vires act Is not always confined
to the state, the stockholders of the corporation and the creditors, but
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may sometimes be exercisied by third persons whose rights are injuriously affected by such acts. Kentucky Heating Co. v. Louisville Gas
Go. 23 Ky. Law Rep. 730, 63 S. W. 751. "It is also the opinion of the
majority of the court that the appellant cannot sell artificial gas alone
or in mixture with natural gas for purposes of illumination without
violation of appellee's exclusive privilege and for doing which that company has the right to complain and to have its injunction made permanent."
In Citizens Gas Light Co. v. Louisville Gas Co. 23 Ky. 263, the
appellee asserted the exclusive right, under an act of the general assembly to manufacture and sell gas in the city of Louisville. Appellant
claimed the same right under an act of the general assembly. Appellee's assertion of exclusive right under an unconstitutional act put
appellant's right under a cloud and prevented it from selling stock a-d
raising means for its purposes. An injunction to restrain the appellees
from setting up such an exclusive right was granted.
This same doctrine prevailed in the case of Louisville and Taylors'vile Turnpike Co. v. Boss, Etc. In that case the charter of the turnpike
company authorized it to collect tolls from persons using the toll bridge
but provided that they should not require citizens of a certain town to
pay toll. They attempted to collect such toll from citizens of this town,
and it was held that they could be restrained from collecting. In all
the above cited cases the complainants had existing rights that were infringed upon by the ultra vires acts, while the appellant in the case at
hand had no rights whatever in the tank cars when they were stored
and did not become a creditor until some time later.
The general rule, as recognized by the majority of jurisdictions,
Is that the validity of an ultra vires act cannot be complained of by an
unsecured creditor whose rights accrued subsequently, particularly so
when he had notice of the transaction. Wilson v. Mechanical Orguinette Co., 57 App. Div. 158, 68 N. Y. Supp. 173; Alis v. Jones, 45 Fed. 148;
Beach v. Wakefield, 107 Iowa 567, 76 N. W. 688, 78 N. W. 197.
And then, too, the circumstances under which the cars were stored
with the elevator company must be looked into. The tank line being in
financial straits, it was necessary that they procure as cheap storing
space as possible, and as the elevator company offered much cheaper
storage than did the railroad company it is only reasonable that they
should store them with the former.
It is manifest that the court in rendering this decision has followed the rule that has been established in the majority of other juri;sdictions besides being guided by good and sound reasoning. M. W. M.
CRunNAL L&w-AccusED, TAKEN TO THE JAIL WHEN THE JunY RETIRED AND KEPT THERE UNTIL AFTER THE VERDIcT, WAs DEIED RIGHTS
AND PREJUDIcED EVEN THOUGH HIS ATTORNEY POLLED JuRY.-On his trial

for a second offense under the Rash-Gullion Act, when the jury retired
to consider its verdict the accused was taken to Jail, where he remained
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until after the verdict was returned. The attorney of the accused polled
the jury. Held, the accused is guaranteed the right to be present at
every stage of the trial, in a criminal prosecution, and a return of the
verdict during his confinement was a denial of his constitutional and
statutory rights, even though the jury was polled by his attorney.
Riddell v. Commonwealth, 216 Ky. 221, 287 S. W. 704.
It should be pointed out. here that the second offense under the
Rash-Gullion Act is made a felony. Sec. 183 of the Criminal Code of
Ky., provides that "if the indictment be for a felony, the defendant must
be present, and shall remain in actual custody during the trial . . .
but judgment shall not be rendered until the -presence of defendant is
obtained." And Sec. 11 of the Bill of Rights of the Kentucky Constitution gives the accused in all criminal prosecutions the right to meet
the witnesses face to face, and to be heard by himself and counsel. These
provisions are the chief basis for the decision.
To further uphold the present decision the court cited Temple v.
Commonwealth, 14 Bush (Ky.) 769. In that case a verdict of guilty of
manslaughter was received in the absence of the accused and his counsel from the court room. IOn appeal, the court in an opinion reversing
the judgment of "thetrial court, said: "and at no time in the whole trial
is this right (of presence) more valuable than at the final step when
the jury are to pronounce the decision. . . . The right to poll the
jury in criminal cases has In this state always been deemed an essential part of the right of trial by jury." This rule is supported by
Kolah v. Commonwealth, 194 Ky. 44, 273 S. W. 1090.
It appears that the weight of authority in other states on the point
in question is in accord with the present case. In Lyons v. State, 7 Ga.
App. 50, 66 S. E. 149, it was held, a reception of a verdict during accused's absence while in jail rendered the verdict void. Like decisions
where defendanf was absent at time of return of verdict have been
given in Hunt v. City of Tupelo, 112 Miss. 178, 72 So. 895; and Woods v.
City of Tupelo, 112 Miss. 132, 72 So. 879. Lyons v. State, supra, stated
the rule further than though the accused may waive his right to be
present, the right to waive his presence is personal, and cannot be exercised for him by counsel. "The presence of counsel was no substitute for that of the man on trial," Wilson v. State, 87 Ga. 584, 13 S.
E. 566.
In elaborating on the present decision, in connection with the Bill
of Rights and the Criminal Code of Kentucky, the court declared: "He
had the right to see and know that the entire jury was assenting to the
verdict by polling the jury and requiring each juror when face to face
with him to state that the verdict was his verdict." This position is
well founded in reason and precedents both in the Kentucky court and
E. C. M.
in courts of other states.
CRiIr3lNAL LAW-AIDEn AND ABurOR XN CaX
MAY BE CoNvicTEu Ar

Pizmraiw's

ACQUiTTAL

OF BURNING OF HOUSE
(Ky. STATS.,

SEorIN1

1169.)-The defendant was convicted of burning the dwelling house of

357
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another. Some time prior to this he had taken out insurance on his
household effects that were in the house. After the fire no remains of
any burned articles could be found and the evidence substantiated a
conspiracy on the part of the defendant and his wife to burn the house
to collect the insurance. The grand jury returned an indictment in the
first count of which the defendant was charged with burning this house
and in the second count his wife was charged with the burning, and the
defendant was charged with being present, aiding and abetting. The
wife was tried first and acquitted. The defendant then moved the court
to abate the prosecution and quash and dismiss the indictment because
his wife, who had been charged with the burning, had been acquitted;
that after the acquittal of the principal he could not be convicted of
aiding and abetting. The conviction was affirmed. gmith v. Commonwealth, 216 Ky. 813, 288 S. W. 752.
The defendant was indicted and convicted under Section 1169 of
the Kentucky Statutes, which makes it unlawful for any person to burn
any dwelling house or other building or house upon which there is any
Insurance or lien, providing a penalty therefor of not less than one nor
more than six years in the penitentiary. It was insisted that the conviction was faulty because the proof did not show that there was any
Insurance on the building. But the indictment did fiot aver that he
burned the building with the intent to collect the insurance, and it was
held in Hays v. Uommonwealth, 211 Ky. 716, 277 S. W. 1004, that "it is
not necessary in an indictment under this section (Section 1169) to
aver' that the burning was done with the intent to collect the insurance." However it is quite evident that the defendant in this case intended to have the house burn in order to collect the insurance which
he had on the contents.
The primary defense relied on by the defendant was that after the
acquittal of the principal, his wife, the defendant could not be convicted
'as alder and abettor. But it was laid down as a well settled rule, In
the case of Christie v. Commonwealth, 193 Ky. 799, 237 S. W. 660, that
"in this state the principal and the aider and abettor may be indicted
or tried jointly or separately. It is also the rule that an aider and
abettor in the commisision of a felony may be convicted of a felony at
a subsequent term of court, though the principal was tried at a former
term, and was either acquitted of the crime charged, or was convicted
of a misdemeanor only, any proof of such trial and acquittal or convict .on of a misdemeanor is not admissable on the trial of the aider and
abettor." This principal is on all fours with that established in Reed
v. Commonwe-lth, 125 Ky. 126, 100 S. W. 856; Steeley v. Commonwealth,
132 Ky. 213, 116 S. W. 714; Cupp v. Commonwealth, 87 Ky. 35, 7 S.
W. 405.
It is quite apparent that the holding in the case at hand is in keeping with the doctrine which already prevails in this jurisdiction.
M. W. M.
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IEDicATIo1-RIGHT TO USE STREETS LAID OFF IN NEW SUBDIVISI N

AFTEF PLAT DEDICATING THunm To PUBLIC wAs

RECORDED, HELD To EXTEND

TO PURCHASER, UNDER PREVIOUS PLAT OF LOT ADJOINING SUOH STREET

REGARDLESS OF ACCEPTANCE OF MUNIcIPALITY.-A part of a tract of vaCant and unimproved land in the city of Latonia was subdivided Into
town lots, a plat made giving numbers and dimensions of the lots, and
the location of the streets. The plat was duly acknowledged and recorded by the owner and her husband. The appellee was the owner,
at the time of the action, of lot number 84 of that subdivision; this lot
faced on Park avenue. Several years after the first subdivision was
made the trustees of the estate of the original owned subdivided the
remainder of the tract of land. A plat was made showing the numbers
and dimensions of the various new lots, the streets, alleys, and driveways. The plat was recorded, the certificate of acknowledgment expressly dedicating the streets, etc., to the public use. At the time of
the action the whole tract was in the corporate limits of the city of
Covington. The lots and streets of the old plat were shown on the new
plat. The question in the case was the right of the appellee to use a
new street laid on the south side of his property. The appellants contended that the right of easment. did not pass to the appellee as he purchased before the plat was made and the street dedicated.
The court held that the street was dedicated to-the public and
the appellee as a member of the public had a right to use it, and
the conclusion would be the same regardless whether the street
been accepted by the city. VoZpenhei et al.v. Westerfield, 216 Ky.
287 S. W. 545.

that
that
had
157,

The court based its conclusion on two cases: Schneider v. Jacob,
86 Ky. 101, and Hoskins v. Wathen, 20 K. L. R. 814. The court held in
the -former case that where the owner of land lays the same out into
building lots, streets, and alleys, and exhibits a map of it, whibh defines the lots, streets, and alleys, though the streets are not yet actually
opened, and sells the lots as bounded by such streets or alleys, this is
an immediate dedication of such street or alley to the use of the purchaser and to the public. The court said concerning the acceptance by
the city, "And although these streets and alleys may not actually be
opened by the authority of the city or town; although they may be repudiated as public thoroughfares by the city, as in this case, and different streets and alleys opened up in their stead, yet the purchasers of
the lots, with clear reference to the streets and alleys as defined in the
map or plan, are entitled, as between them and the seller, to the benefits of the dedication."
In the latter case the court held that a certain avenue was dedicated to the public use when the property was laid off into lots and
streets, and the plat of it recorded and the sale of lots made with reference to streets and alleys; that the appellant had an easement in the
street notwithstanding the fact that the general council had not ac-
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tepted or improved the street. In looking at these two cases it seems
that the principal case was easily on the side of the appellee.
The case of Schneider v. Jacob, supra, held that if the lots were
-sold in reference to the streets, alleys, etc., shown on the plan that the
streets, etc., would be dedicated to the purchaser and the public. The
rule laid down in that case did not mention recording at all. The ca'.e
Is much stronger here where the streets, etc., were specially dedicated
to the public by the acknowledgment of the trustees.
In both of the cases cited the city had shown an intention on the
mhatter of acceptance. In the former case they repudiated the thoroughfares, and in the latter case the city refused to accept the part of the
streets on which the appellees had placed part of an office building. The
case is much stronger here .where the intention of the city was not
shown at all all. The principal case it seems comes within the doctrine
of these two cases.
In the principal case the trustee specially provided for dedication.
The question might arise as to whether recording alone would be sufficient to dedicate the streets. In EBliott. v. City of Louisville, 123 Ky.
278, 90 S. W. 990, the court held that where the owner of certain outlying property adjacent to the city platted the same, and caused a map
thereof to be recorded in the county clerk's office on which one square,
situated near the center of the plat, was given a number and designated
"Elliott Park," such acts constituted a valid dedication of the park to
the city, which it was entitled to accept in the future.
The rule seems to be that where there has been a sale by reference
to a plat on which streets, alleys, etc., are reprsented that the ways so
represented are dedicated to the public. In Louisville v. Mutual Life
Insurance Company, 147 Ky. 141, 738, 143 S. W. 782, 145 S. W. 389 It
was held that a dedication effected by sales with reference to a plat,
cannot be revoked even though there has been no indication of accepts. S. F.
.ance.
EMINENT DomAIN-PROPERTY RIGHT IN CoRPsE is NoT SUCH AS MAY
33 CONDE-INaED Wrnm KETucxY COxSTITUTION SECTION 242 REQUIING
JUST CoPEN-S.ATION Pon TAxiNG PnIVATE PnoPERTY.-Plaintiff's husband
.died in the Western State Hospital. The authorities were unable to
locate the widow and shipped the body to the University of Louisville.
Plaintiff finally recovered the body, but the skin of the back of the left
band was.gone leaving the bones and tendons exposed. Held: the property right in a corpse is not property for which just compensation must
be made. University of Louisville et al. v. Metcalfe, 216 Ky. 339, 287
.S.W. 945.
Section 242 of the Constitution of Kentucky provides: "Municipal
and other corporations, and individuals invested with the privilege of
tajing of private property for public use, shall make just compensation
for property taken; which compensation shall be paid before such taking, or paid or secured at the election of such corporation or individual,
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before such injury or destruction. . . ." An asylum, although a mere
Instrumentality of the state government brought into being to aid in
the performance of a governmental duty, can not take or injure the
property of another without making just compensation therefor as required by section 242 of the constitution quoted supra. Hauns v. Csntral Kentuck~y State Lunatic Asylum, 103 Ky. 562, 45 S. W. 890.
But the principal case does not fall within the exception to the
asylumn's non-liability. Whatever may be the extent and nature of
one's property right in a corpse, it is not the kind of property that may
be condemned, and is not, therefore, within the protection of section
242 of the constitution. There is no property right in the strict sense
or in the ordinary use of the term in the dead body of a human being.
Hockenhaammer v. Lexington Eastern Railway Co., 23 K. L. R. 2383,
74 S. W. 222. After burial the body becomes part and parcel of the
ground to which it Is committed. Pulsifier v. Douglass, 94 Me. 556, 48
Atl. 11-8, 53 L. R. A. 238.
However, the right to preserve the remains of a dead person or to
bury a corpse Is a legal right which the courts recognize and protect
as a quasi right of property. Neighbors v. Neighbors, 112 Ky. 161, 65
S. W. 604; Buchanan v. Buchanan, 28 Misc. 261, 59 N. Y. Supp. 810;
Medical College v. Bushing, 1 Ga. App. 468, 57 S. E. 1083. But whatever
quasi property rights exist in a dead body are recognized and protected
only for the purpose of burial and preservation of the remains after
burial. Long v. Chicago Railroad Co., 15 Okla. 512, 86 Pac. 289, 6 L.
R. A. (N. S.) 883.
In some parts of Europe during the semi-barbarous state of society
of the Middle Ages the law permitted a creditor to seize the dead body
of his debtor. In ancient Egypt a son could borrow money by hypothecating his father's corpse. But no evidence appears to exist in modern
jurisprudence of a legal right to convert a dead body to any purpose
of pecuniary profit. Matter of Beekman, 4 Bradf. Surr. (N. Y.) 503.
Whatever legal rights exist as to preservation and burial, It Is clear
that there is ho technical right of property in a dead body within the
W. D. S.
meaning of section 242 of the constitution of Kentucky.
HomircDE--DECEAsED's STATEM-NTS TO PERSONS FrNDn1qG HIM FATJMY WOUNDED HELD MADE IN EXTREnS AND ADmfIssAnaL .As DYING
D.EcLARATIow, i' OTHERWISE Co0xmETENT.-The defendants were indicted
and charged with the murder of H. on June 13, 1925, and which the
'evidence shows was committed by the perpetrators by waylaying him,
while he was travelling on horseback on a public road near his home
and near the home of the defendants, and shooting him with a shotgan
loaded with buck shot from the effects of which he died. Upon their
joint trial they were convicted. They appealed on the ground that the
trial court erred in the admission of incompetent evidence offered by
the Commonwealth. The evidence showed that deceased was shot ihle
on his way home late in the afternoon. He was found early the next
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morning by his brother and brother-in-law, lying in the road suffering
from his wounds but not quite dead. He recognized the voice of his
brother and called to him and said that he was killed; whereupon the
brother inquired how it happened, and then he said in response to a
question as to who killed him: "Lish Short, Fletch Smith and Asbury
Spicer," (the latter was not on trial as he had not been apprehended).
The brother then asked him: "How do you know?" He answered, "I
saw them right over on the hill there." That conversation was had
between the two brothers after the brother-in-law had gone for some
water, which deceased called for when they first arrived, but he had
previously stated to the brother-in-law before his departure for the
water, and which the latter testified to, that the defendants were the
ones who waylaid and shot him. Held, that whatever he said on that
occasion, if otherwise competent, was made in extremis so as to be
9dmissable as a dying declaration. Fletch Smith and Bsha Shor v.
Commonwealth, 216 Ky. 832, 288 S. W. 768. "The declarations of the
deceased, voluntarily made, while :ane, when in articula mortis, and
under the solemn conviction of approaching dissolution, concerning the
facts and circumstances constituting the res gestae of his destruction,
are always admissable in evidence, provided the deceased would be a
competent witness if living. The general principle upon which this
species of evidence Is admitted is, that they are declarations made in
extremity, when the party is at the point of death and when every hope
of this world is gone, when every motive of falsehood is silenced, and
the mind Is induced by the most powerful consideration to speak the
truth; a situation so solemn, and so awful, being considered by the law
as creating an obligation equal to that which is imposed by a posItive
oath administered in a court of justice." Bibbs v. Commonwealth, 138
Ky. 558, 128 S. W. 871. The foregoing decision was also followed in
the, cases of Commonwealth v. Johmon, 158 Ky. 582, 65 S. W. 984 and
Lucas v. Commonwealth 153 Ky. 424, 155 S. W. 721. The admission of
dying declarations is in derogation of two general and fundamental
rules for safeguarding and testing truth, to-wit: The oath and crossexamination. They are, therefore, admitted only on the grounds of
necessity and public policy and are strictly limited to the act of killing and such circumstances as immediately attend such act and constitute a part of the res gestae. Lucas v. Commonwealth, supra. The
admission of dying declarations in cases of homicide was a rule of the
English common law and was not changed by the provisions of the
Kentucky Constitution, Section 11 thereof, merely requiring that those
who testify as to facts which are competent as evidence under the law,
shall meet the accused face to face. Walston, v. Commonwealth, 16
B. M. 15.
M. W. M.
INSANE PEaONS-OLIGATION TO PAY FOP. NECESSARY SERVICES FURNISREH A PERSON OF UNSOUND MIND IS IPLTED IF FURNIISnE WITH INTENT TO CHBo:A TBFMW0o.--Plaintiff's sister became insane and ill. The
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plaintiff was sent for to come and care for her sister. She did go and
ta'ke care of her, staying there day and night, and doing all the work,
including nursing, washing and cooking. After the sister's death
plaintiff filed a claim against the estate for her services. The evidence
clearly showed that the services were necessary and renderd for a prson of unsound mind. Held:- That if the services were furnished with
an intent to charge therefor an obligation to pay for them was implied.
-offee v. Owen's Administrator, 216 Ky. 142, 278 S. W. 540.
When necessaries are furnished to a person who by reason of
mental incapacity cannot himself make a contract, the law implies an
obligation on the part of such person to pay for such necessaries out of
his own property. Pearlv. McDowell, 3 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 658, 20 Am.
Dec. 199; Smith's Com2ittee v. Forsythe, 28 K. L. R. 1034, 90 S. W.
1075. This rule prevails in most jurisdictions. Rceva v. True, 53 N. H.
627; Snyder v. Nixon, 188 Iowa 779, 176 N. W. 808.
In the principal case the court charged the jury in effect that if
they believed from the evidence that the said services were rendered on
account of relationship existing between plaintiff and decedent and without any intention on the part of plaintiff to charge for same at the time
services were rendered, then plaintiff could not recover. Was this instruction correct? Must the services be furnished with an intent to
charge therefor? These questions are answered in the affirmative by
Sheltman v. Taylor's Committee, 116 Va. 762, 82 S. E. 698. The rule is
well stated by the Missouri Court. A contract binding an insane person
to pay the reasonable value of necessaries furnished him is implied in
law, provided the parties furnishing the necessaries intended to charge
therefor at the time. Hartley v. Hartley's Bstate, 173 Mo. App. 18, 155
S. W. 1099. The credit must have been extended to him and not to a
third person. Mass. General Hospital v. Fairbanks, 129 Mass. 78, 37
Am. Rep. 303; McClenahan v. Howard, 50 Cal. App. 309, 195 Pac. 68.
The instruction of the court in the instant case is clearly correct
and in accord with the earlier decisions of this state as well as the rule
R. R. R.
which prevails in many other jurisdictions.
Juny-JunY CONTAINING ONE BYSTANDER AFTER Six BYSTANDERS HAD

BEEN SUMMONED TO CO P.ETE PAXEM OF EIGHTEEN AND EACH PARTY HA
STaIcKEN THERE NAmEs, HELD NOT PROPERLY ImPANELED (KY. ST. 2247).
-In a civil action, twelve of the jurors drawn were engaged in trying
another case and excused. To complete the panel of eighteen the court
directed that six bystanders be summoned. After each party had
stricken three names from the panel there remained a jury composed
of eleven regular jurors whose names had been drawn from the drum
and one bystander. Held, the jury was improperly impaneled. Martin
et al. v. Stumbo EBlhorn Coal Co., 216 Ky. 147, 287 S. W. 539.
Ky. St. Sec. 2247, which governs this decision, provides that in selecting the petit jury vacancies in the panel shall be filled by drawing
again from the drum or wheel case double the number of names neces-
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sary to supply the places of such as are excused or that failed to attend;
"Provided, that when the number of vacancies does not exceed three,
the judge may direct the sheriff to summon by standers to supply the
vacancies."
Clearly, by authority of this statute and preceding cases, bystanders could have been summoned to f1l the vacancies had said vacancies not exceeded three. Gentry v..State, 68 Tex. Cr. Rep. 567, 152 S. W.
635; State v. Bosworth, 86 Vt. 71, 83 A. 657; Watson v. State, 9 Okla. Cr.
1, 130 P. 816; Thurman v. Commonwealth, 154 Ky. 555, 157 S. W. 919.
It will be observed in 3 Blackstone Comm. p. 364, that the right to summon talesmen also exists at common law.
However, the selection of bystanders to fill any number of vacancies
more than three is contrary to the statutory law of Kentucky. This is
the proper interpretation of the statute, according to the holding in
Louisville & X. R. Co. v. King, 161 Ky. 324, 170 S. W. 938. In that case
ten members of the panel were called from the bystanders, and though
only three of the ten remained on the jury of twelve after the peremptory challenge, it was held to be not properly impaneled. It was
further stated that the basic reason for the rule is to insure the competency of the jury as a whole by tendering the litigant eighteen qualified jurymen from whom to select the twelve who are to try his case.
The decisions on this point-as to the limitation of the number of
the members of a panel to be taken from bystanders-are few. It seems
that no other state statute has a similar provision concerning the restricted number of bystanders that may be called, or at least, that no
cases involving that ]oint have been decided by the supreme courts of
other states. But in view of the words in Ky. St. Sec. 2247 and the
underlying reason for the rule the conclusion reached in the present
case appears logical and sound.
E. C. M.
MINES AND MINEnASL---MS M IERL IN PLACE IS WILLFULLY REMOVED WITHOUT KNOWLEDGE OP OwNER, MEASURE Or DIGEs XS MARXET
VALUE WITHOUT REDUCTION FOR COST OF MING.-Plaintiff and defendant owned adjoining mining leases covering the same seam of coal. Defendant extended its passageways, which were ninety feet under ground,
and took 3,116 tons of coal from plaintiff's lease. The trial court found
that the taking of the coal was willful. Held: Judgment for plaintiff
for the full value of the coal at the place where it was mined without
deduction for cost of mining. Jin. Thompson Coal Company et al. v.
Dentzell, 216 Ky. 160, 287 S. W. 548.
The Kentucky court has adopted the rule that where mineral in
place is, through the willful act of another, mined and removed without
the knowledge or consent of the owner, his measure of damages is the
market value thereof at the place where it was taken, without reduction
for cost of mining; while if the mining and removal is the result of an
honest mistake, as where there is a dispute as to the location of the
property line, then the measure of damages is the fair market value of
the mineral in place and may be usually fixed by proving the customary
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royalty in that vicinity. North Jellico Coal Company v. Helton, 187 Ky.
394, 219 S. W. 185; New Domain Oil & Gas Co. v. McKinney, 188 Ky.
186, 221 S. W. 245; Gerkins v. Kentucky Salt Co., 100 Ky. 734, 24 K. L.
R. 34; Bennett Jellico Coal Co. v. East Jeflico Coal Co., 152 Ky. 838,
154 S. W. 922. The same rule is applied in the courts of many other
states. Ivy Coal Co. v. Alabama Coal Go., 125 Ala. 579, 33 S. 547; Sunnyside Coal Co. v. Reitz, 14 Ind. App. 478, 39 N. E. 541; Hartford Iron.
Mining Co. v. Cambria Mineral Co., 93 Mich. 90, 53 N. W. 4. The Fedsral
courts follow the same rule. Wooden Ware Co. v. United States, 106
U. S. 432; Liberty Bell Gold Mining Co. v. Smuggler, 203 Federal 795.
On the other hand, it has been held in some jurisdictions in cases
of wilful trespass that the injured party may recover actual damages
for the full value of ore in place at the mine at the time of removal and
also exemplary or punitive damages. Illinois Railroad Co. v. Ogle, 92
Ill. 353; Barton Coal Co. v. Cox, 39 Md. 1, 17 Am. Rep. 525. However,
this Is the minority rule and Is not followed in the recent cases. Crawford v. Forest Oil Co., 208 Pa. St. 5, 57 A. 47; Donovan v. St. Louis Consolidated Coal Co., 88 Ill. App. 589, affirmed in 187 11. 28, 58 N. E. 290.
The test which determines whether one was a wilful trespasser or
an innocent trespasser is not his violation of or compliance with the
law, but his honest belief and actual intention at the time he committed the trespass. Montrozona Coal Mining Co. v. Thaliber, 19 Colo.
App. 371, 75 P. 595; United States v. Homestake Mining Co., 47 Fed. 481,
54 C. C. A. 303.
The question presented by the principal case is essentially one of
the measure of damages, not of liability. The ruli adopted by the Kentucky court seems to be the most logical solution of the problem.
W. D. S.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER-MONEY PAID BY MUTUAL MISTARE FOR SUP.

rosED QuANT=rY OF LAND WHICH DiD NOT ExisT MAY 33E REcovERau m"
AssumrPsIT, THoUGH THERE HAS BEEN No Evicriom.-Defendants sold
and conveyed to plaintiffs by deed of general warranty a piece of land.
The property was sold by the front foot and not by boundary. By
mutual mistake it was estimated that there was 66 feet of such frontage
and the plaintiffs paid $6,600.00 therefor. In fact there were only 63.8
front feet and the defendants were overpaid the sum of $220.00. Plaintiffs sought to recover this sum, setting up no consideration. Held:
That the recovery could be had in assumpsit upon an implied contract
to refund money paid as the result of mutual mistake. Broaddus & West
v. Jackson, 216 Ky. 241, 287 S. W. 701.
It is a well established rule in Kentucky that the right to relief
for a deficit is based upon an implied assumpsit to refund the money
paid by mistake. Crane v. Prather, 4 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 75; Dye v.
Holland, 4 Bush (Ky.) 635; Young v. Craig, 2 Bibb. (Ky.) 270; Harri.
son v. Talbot, 2 Dana (Ky.) 258. The principle was applied by this
court In a later decision, when it held that where the vendee had paid
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the purchase money for thirty-one acres more than the boundary contained the law implied a contract upon the part of the vendor to refund to the vendee the excessive amount thus paid. Nave v. Price, 198

Ky. 105, 55 S. W. 882, 21 Ky. Law Rep. 1538.
In the principal case the trial court took the view that the action
was brought on a breach of covenant of general warranty and could
not be maintained until after eviction. The appellate court was correct
in holding such ruling erroneous. The suit is based on an entirely
different principle. The title of the land conveyed was not questioned,
hence there was no breach of warranty and the question of eviction was
not involved. But it is sought to recover money paid by mutual mistake for a supposed quantity of land which did not exist. The true
basis of the adtion was well stated by the court in Biggs v. Lexington
& Big Sandy R. R. Co., 79 Ky. 475. The court said: "This right of
action is based upon the contract which the'law implies as the result
of justice and reason growing out of the mutual mistake of innocent
parties."
The Georgia court applied the same rule in Mobley v. Harrell, 13
Ga. App. 483, 79 S. E. 372. This is the general rule and has been established in most jurisdictions. White v. Miler, 22 Vt. 380; Wilson v.
Randall, 67 N. Y. 338; Butih v. Sanith, 121 Wis. 566, 99 N. W. 328, 105
Am. St. Rep. 1039; Hull v. Watts, 95 Va. 10, 27 S. E. 829. There is a
distinction, however, where the land Is sold by the tract or in gross and
not by the acre. Rauwlings v. Cohen, 143 Ga. 726, 85 S. E. 851; Ward v.
Dean, 69 Minn. 466, 72 N. W. 710.
The decision of the court in the present case is unquestionably correct both on principle and sound reasoning. It is in accord with -the
previous cases in this jurisdiction and supported by the great weight
of authority.
R. R. R.

WmLs-Lnm ATON OvEn Arnm Dzwis. oF FEx is Vore, nue Axrzn
LnF ESTATB Is VAJa.-The Plaintiff entered, into a written contract
whereby he sold the defendant a farm. The defendant refused to take
the property upon the ground that the plaintiff could not convey a good
title. The plaintiff then brought this action for specific performance.
His title depended upon the construction of his father's will, the material portions of which are as follows: "Second: After my death I will
and bequeath to my beloved wife, Joanne Elizabeth Utz, all of my
estate both real and personal to have and to hold during her natural
life as long as she remains my widow. It being my desire that as long
as she remains my widow for her to have the full control and use of
my estate for her own personal benefit.
"Third: At the death of my wife or if she should at any time become the wife of someone else, then in either case it is my will, and I
so devise, that all of my estate that remains at that time will go and
belong to my son, James W. Utz, to have and use as he sees best, at his
death to his legal heirs." Held: That the plaintiff by this will re-
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ceived a fee simple title to the land and his prayer for the specific performance of the contract to convey should be granted. Beemon v. Utz,
217 Ky. 158, 289 S. W. 221.
The court on appeal declared that "a limitation over after a devise
of the fee was void but the limitation over after a life estate is valid."
It also held that in determining whether the testator intended to devise
a fee to his son or a life estate, all the words of the will should be construed together. The fact that the testator used very apt words: "to
have and to hold during her natural life" when he intended to devise
a life estate to the wife, was sufficient to show that he knew what words
to employ in order to effect that end.
"If he intended to devise a
mere life estate to his son the natural thing to have done would have
been to use the same language which he employed in the devise to his
wife. Not having done this but having provided that all his estate, both
real and personal, should 'belong to my son James W. Utz to have and
use as he sees best,' we are constrained to hold that the words 'at his
death of his legal heirs' were not sufficient to impart a life estate, but
were a mere attempt on the part of the testator to limit the estate after
a devise of the fee and that the limitation was invalid." Harkness v.
Lisle, 132 Ky. 767, 117 S. W. 264.
The case of Harkness v. Lisle, supra, was an action brought for the
construction of a will which devised the land in question in the following words: "I give, devise and bequeath to my son James Lisle and his
children two hundred and fifty acres of land." By another clause the
testator attempted to restrain the alienation of the land by the following clause: "Neither of my children nor the trustees herein named
shall sell, convey, or in any way charge or incumber the land herein
devised for any purpose during the lifetime of any of my said children."
The court decided that the devise was that of a fee and the latter clause
an invalid attempt to restrain the alienation of the same. The court
here recognized that the words "and his children" are commonly 'ccepted as words of purchase rather than words of limitation but in this
case by the general import of the whole will they found that the testator intended to use them as words of limitation synonymously with the
words "and his heirs." (The trial court found as a fact that the proposed alienation by the devisee for which purpose the action was
brought was advantageous to all concerned.)
The court in considering the reasonableness of the restraint upon
the alienation of the fee by the devisee said: "Here the testator attempted to impose a restraint upon the alienation not for a specil.ed
period of time nor until the devisee arrived at a certain age, but during
the entire lifetime of the devisee. The general rule is that the right
of alienation is an inherent and inseparable quality of every vested
fee-simple estate. To hold that alienation could be restrained during
the lifetime of the fee-simple holder would be to deprive the fee of all
of its essential qualities. . . . while bound by the former adjudications of this court to adhere to the doctrine that a limitation for a
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reasonable length of time is valid, we have no hesitation in saying that
the limitation attempted to be imposed by the will in question is unreasonable. A testator cannot devise a fee and then destroy it entirely."
The holding in the principal case is undoubtedly in accord with
the general rule that any attempt to restrain the alienation of a fee
that is subject to a devise is invalid. Potter v. Couch, 141 U. S. 296,
35 L. Ed. 721, 11 Sp. Ct. 1005; McFadden v. McFadden, 302 Ill. 504, 135
N. E. 31; Winsor v. MiUls, 157 Mass. 362, 32 U. S. 352; Burnett v. Chapin,
77 Mich. 538, 7 L. R. A. 377, and also the modified doctrine of the Kentucky courts that an unreasonable attempt to restrain the alienation of
the fee for an unlimited period is invalid. Stewart v. Brady, 3 Bush
623; Lawson v. Lislefoot, 27 Ky. L. Rep. 217, 84 S. W. 739; Price v. Virginia Iron and C. Co., 171 Ky. 523, 188 S. W. 658; Call v. ShEenaker,
24 Ky. L. R. 686, 69 S. W. 749; Mortons' Guardian v. Morton, 120 Ky.
251, 85 S. W. 1188; Cropperv. Bowles, 150 Ky. 393, 150 S. W. 380; Thurinond v. Thurmond, 190 Ky. 582, 228 S. W. 29.
C. P. R.

WrrNnssEs-Wis TEsTihoqy AGAINST HUSBAND IS INCOMPMENT
ON ISSUE OF ABANDONmENT,

BUT (CONPT

NT ON THAT OF CauE

TREAT-

zvmt.-The plaintiff brought an action for a divorce a mensa et thoro
under allegations of abandonment and cruel and inhuman treatment.
The wife who was the plaintiff offered in evidence that both she and
her husband had been previously married and divorced; that she had
been ill, weak and in bad health; that notwithstanding this fact the
defendant refused to give her money with which she could buy clothes
and necessities, and forced her to work; that the defendant had accused her of being a prostitute during their married life, and of maintaining illicit relations with other men; that he was jealous and unduly
suspicious of her and would never permit her to leave home unless
accompanied by himself or his mother; that he accused her of attempting to poison him; and finally while she was sick in bed he left her at
home alone without food or money and has never returned. The defendant objected that the evidence of the wife was incompetent. Held:
that the evidence of the wife was clearly inadmissable upon an issue
of abandonment, but admissable as bearing upon and tending to establish cruel and inhuman treatment. Wermeling v. Wermeling, 217 Ky.
126, 288 S. W. 1050.
The court on appeal said that it was admitted that the wife's testimony was competent under Section 606 of the Civil Code as amended Dy
act of 1912 c. 104 if the evidence offered tended to establish cruel and
inhuman treatment. It also decided that cruel and inhuman treatment
provided by the statutes as a ground for divorce was not limited to acts
of personal violence but could be established by evidence showing such
treatment in other ways as endangers health or otherwise brings about
such a situation as renders co-habitation intolerable.
In the case of Fightmasterv. Fightmaster,22 R. 1512, 60 S. W. 918,
the plaintiff in action for a divorce offered her own deposition to
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establish the cruel and inhuman treatment which she had suffered from
the husband. The court held that such evidence was incompetent
under Section,606 Kentucky Civil Code, prohibiting either the wife or
the husband to testify against the other in an action for a divorce. This
case was before the court prior to the enactment of the Act of March
15, 1912, c. 104 p. 295, which excluded an action for divorce upon the
grounds of cruel and inhuman treatment from the general provisions
of Section 606 Kentucky Civil Code.
The case of Hester v. Hester, 166 Ky. 544, 179 S. W. 451, was an
action for divorce upon the ground of cruel and inhuman treatment.
The wife was allowed to give evidence as to her residence, which is required by Section 422 Kentucky Civil Code. The court held on appeal
that the wife was a competent witness upon the issue of cruel and inhuman treatment by virtue of the amendment of Section 606 Kentucky
Civil Code, by the Act of 1912, c. 104, but that her evidence should be
limited to that issue and it was error for the chancellor to grant the
divorce without other evidence of her residence. The Court of Appeals,
however, does have jurisdiction to reverse a decree granting a divorce.
Ky. St. Section 950-1.
In an analogous case the court again held that the wife was a competent witness to establish cruel and inhuman treatment at the hands
of the husband and that a judgment dismissing the bill upon that objection alone should be reversed and an order granting the divorce should
be entered. Hayden v. Hayden, 167 Ky. 569, 180 S. W. 961.
The general rule as provided by Section 606, Kentucky Civil Code,
is contra to that which prevails in many jurisdictions, for in actions
for-divorce husband and wife are usually competent witnesses against
each other,
Scarborough v. Scarborough, 54 Ark. 20 14 S. W. 1098; Foss v.
Foss, 12 Allen (Mass.) 26; Wood v. Wood, - N. 3. (Ch. 1905), 62 Atl.
427; Schaab v. ,Srhaab, 66 N. J. Eq. 334, 57 Atl. 1090; Ghamriberlainv.
People, 23 N. Y. 85, 81 Am. Des. 255; Seitz v. Seitz, 170 Pa. St. 71. 32
Atl. 578; Hedderson v. Hedderson, 35 Pa. Supr. Ct. 629; Gardner v.
Gardner, 104 Tenn. 410, 58 S. W. 342, 78 Am. St. Rep. 924. Under the
provisions of the Kentucky Statutes, however, the principal case is
C. P. I.
clearly right.

